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Note
Jacobson v. United States: Do The Ends Justify
the Means in Government Stings?
The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every commanding
corner. There was one on the house front immediately opposite.
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said .... In the
far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs,
hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again
with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into peo-
ple's windows. The patrols did not matter, however. Only the
Thought Police mattered.'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last few decades, the United States government has
been using increasingly elaborate undercover stings2 to detect and
punish criminals.3 Proponents of stings argue that they are often
the only effective means of law enforcement.4 Some critics con-
tend, however, that these operations infringe on individual rights.-
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 4 (1947). Orwell's "Big Brother" recently reappeared in
the comments of one writer who stated:
Big Brother has gone big time: He's posing as your friendly interior decorator,
futures trader, salesman, investor, contractor, meat inspector, land developer,
judge, and lawyer-not to mention the usual drug dealer, arms merchant,
pornographer, and money launderer. It seems all the world's a stage for the
federal government as it pursues scores of undercover sting operations in its
battle against crime.
Saul M. Pilchen, The Underside of Undercover Operations, CONN. L. TRIB., July 22, 1991,
at 18.
2. A sting is defined as: "[a]n undercover police operation in which police pose as
criminals to trap law violators." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See generally LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME (Frank J.
Remington ed., 1967) (discussing various types of crimes for which stings are considered
essential, including prostitution, liquor sales, and narcotics sales).
4. See, e.g., Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional
Proposals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY
L.J. 75, 78 (1987). "Undercover investigations have been recognized as an effective
means-sometimes the only effective means-of detecting, investigating, successfully
prosecuting, and thereby deterring such concealed offenses." Id.
5. See, e.g., Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Tempta-
tion: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Require-
ment, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1985) (contending that the current focus on the
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Others maintain that it is simply unethical for the government to
create crime to catch criminals.6
The entrapment defense, which allows for acquittal if a defend-
ant can show that the government coerced him into committing
the crime, is an attempt to balance the needs of law enforcement
officials with the rights of individual citizens.7 Though both state
and federal courts allow the entrapment defense," the application
defendant, rather than on the police, results in a standard by which the citizen's morality
is measured and tested by the government at the expense of that individual's rights).
6. See George E. Dix, When Government Deception Goes Too Far, TEX. LAW., Oct.
21, 1991, at 12 (characterizing stings as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and calling
for a reasonable suspicion requirement of criminal activity before a person is targeted in a
sting); Pilchen, supra note 1, at 18 (objecting to the amount of control prosecutors have
over sting operations, because they may design a sting to result in a maximum sentence
on conviction); Geoff Davidian, Stings Raise Legal Hackles in Some Cases, Hous.
CHRON., May 3, 1992, at Cl (discussing several sting operations and criticizing the gov-
ernment for using excessive influence to persuade people to commit crimes).
7. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Concurring in Sorrells, Justice
Roberts defined entrapment as "the conception and planning of an offense by an officer,
and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except
for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court's definition of entrapment, known as the "subjective approach,"
involves a two-part inquiry. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 5.2(a), at 416 (1984) (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)). The first question is whether gov-
ernment agents induced the defendant to commit the crime. Id. The second question is
whether, if the government did induce commission of the crime, the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime independent of government action. Id. This approach
focuses primarily on the defendant's state of mind. See id. at 416-17.
The minority definition of entrapment is known as the "objective approach." PAUL
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE § 5.01, at 171 (1989) [hereinafter MARCUS].
This approach focuses on the outrageousness of the government conduct, rather than on
the defendant's state of mind. Id. Those advocating this approach in the federal courts
often argue that outrageous government conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 171-76. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause pro-
vides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
Proponents of the objective approach contend that it curbs abuses of government
power. MARCUS, supra, at 171-76. The Supreme Court has never adopted the objective
approach, but individual justices have embraced it in some concurring and dissenting
opinions. In addition, the following state courts have adopted the objective approach:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. Other states, including Florida
and New Jersey, have adopted hybrid tests, which combine features of both the objective
and subjective tests. Id. at 172. Regardless of the approach, every state recognizes the
defense in some form. See id. at 172-76; see also infra notes 37-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's analyses of these approaches).
8. See Michael A. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its
History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REv. 243 (1966) (outlining the history of the
entrapment defense and discussing the different ways in which the state and federal
courts apply it).
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of the defense to particular cases has been inconsistent and confus-
ing.9 Neither the legislature nor the courts has established detailed
guidelines for investigators who wish to avoid entrapping their
targets. 10
In spite of the problems and controversies inherent in all sting
operations, the government continues to design and implement
elaborate undercover investigations."I These stings are frequently
used to investigate the producers, peddlers, and purchasers of child
pornography."2 Because it is shrouded in secrecy, the child por-
nography industry presents a special problem for any government
investigation designed to dismantle it. 13 As a result, sting opera-
tions targeting child pornography have become increasingly com-
plex and clandestine.' 4 With the heightened complexity comes the
increased likelihood that agents will unwittingly entrap their
targets, thereby reducing (if not eliminating) the government's
chance of obtaining convictions.'"
Without clear judicial guidance on the entrapment defense, law
enforcement officials will continue to conduct costly sting opera-
tions, while risking acquittals of guilty defendants. Perhaps more
important, until the Supreme Court crafts explicit constitutional
parameters for these investigations, citizens will continue to be un-
witting targets of law enforcement's covert operations.
On April 6, 1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the elements of the entrapment defense in Jacobson v. United
9. See Stephen E. Leidheiser, Comment, Defense of Entrapment: The Confusion Con-
tinues, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 373 (1982) (discussing the fine line between legitimate sting
operations and impermissible police conduct designed to entrap certain individuals).
10. LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 5.1(b), at 413.
11. One well-known example was Abscam, which was conducted by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation in the late 1970s. The operation took its name from the fictitious
Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., which served as the front for the government's operation. Gold-
wasser, supra note 4, at 75 n. 1. The operation began as an effort to recover stolen prop-
erty and developed into an investigation of official corruption. Id.
Abscam resulted in the conviction of one United States Senator and six members of the
House of Representatives. Id. at 75 n.2. The mayor of Camden, New Jersey, several
members of the city council of Philadelphia, and an inspector for the United States Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service were also convicted of charges related to official cor-
ruption. Id.
12. See Jim Spencer, The Sting Master: Baiting the Trap for Pornographers, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 24, 1987, at Cl (describing Operation Borderline, an elaborate child pornog-
raphy sting run by the U.S. Customs Service, which operated under the cover of several
fictitious organizations and resulted in a large number of arrests and convictions). For a
detailed discussion of this sting and other child pornography stings, see infra notes 173-
86 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Spencer, supra note 12.
14. See generally id.
15. See generally id.
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States.16 In a five-to-four decision, the Court voted to reverse the
conviction of a Nebraska farmer for knowing receipt of child por-
nography through the mail.'7 The farmer, Keith Jacobson, was
prosecuted as the result of an elaborate child pornography sting.'"
The Court held that Jacobson had been entrapped as a matter of
law because he was not predisposed to commit the crime indepen-
dently of the government's inducement. 9 For the first time, the
Court expressly stated that a conviction cannot stand if the defend-
ant alleges entrapment, and the government fails to prove that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before its agents
initiated contact with him.20
This Note examines the Court's ongoing struggle with the en-
trapment defense. First, the Note analyzes the evolution of the en-
trapment defense and of the Supreme Court's definition of it.2 '
Second, it discusses the factual background of the Jacobson case
and the Supreme Court's reversal of Jacobson's conviction.22 This
Note both criticizes the government agents who investigated
Jacobson during the sting operation and faults the Supreme Court
for failing to strongly condemn the government's behavior.2 a Next,
it examines the traditional entrapment defense, as applied in Jacob-
son, and contends that the Court's analysis of the two elements-
inducement and predisposition-is flawed. 24 The Note also ex-
plains that, because the "new" Jacobson standard already guided
most sting operations, the case will have a limited impact on future
stings.2 ' Finally, this Note calls for the Court to provide a clear
statement on the reasonableness of government conduct during
sting operations, so that the applicability of the entrapment defense
16. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
17. Id. at 1537.
18. Id at 1537-40.
19. Id. at 1543.
20. Id. at 1540- 41. Prior to this decision, the Court had not discussed the point when
a defendant's lack of criminal predisposition would support a finding of entrapment as a
matter of law. However, some courts held that the defendant had to be predisposed
before any contact by agents occurred. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
Others maintained that the defendant had to be predisposed to commit the crime when
the opportunity was first offered to him. See infra notes 46, 52-53 and accompanying text.
Although there is some Supreme Court precedent tending to support the former view,
Justice O'Connor vigorously argued the latter position in her dissent in Jacobson. See
infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 27-69 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 70-121 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
24. For a full discussion of this test, see infra notes 147-72 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 174-91 and accompanying text.
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will be more predictable in the future.26
II. BACKGROUND
The entrapment defense, which is largely a product of the
United States common law system, was first recognized approxi-
mately one hundred years ago.27 Until that time, most courts had
rejected the defense.28 It was not until the late nineteenth century
that certain state courts began to recognize entrapment as a viable
defense.29 Federal courts, however, were slow to follow the lead of
the state courts.3 ° In addition, the federal courts that did recognize
the defense were divided on the issue of whether the key factor
should be the government's conduct or the defendant's state of
mind.3'
The first federal case to reverse a conviction based on entrap-
ment was Woo Wai v. United States,32 which was decided 37 years
after Saunders v. People,3 3 the first state court decision to recognize
the defense.34 In Woo Wai, the court held that government agents
had entrapped the defendant by coercing him to smuggle aliens
across the Mexican border into the United States.3 The Woo Wai
26. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
27. DeFeo, supra note 8, at 244.
28. Id. Judge Bacon's language, as quoted in Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973,
976 (4th Cir. 1932), rev'd, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), poignantly illustrates the then-prevailing
suspicion of the entrapment defense:
[Even if the inducement to crime be assumed to exist, the allegation of the
defendant] would be but the repetition of the plea as ancient as the world and
first interposed in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled me and I did eat." That
defence [sic] was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we
may form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the
tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not to say
[C]hristian ethics, it never will.
Id. (quoting Board of Comm'rs. v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864)
(quoting Genesis 3:13)).
29. DeFeo, supra note 8, at 247-48 (noting that the first state court to recognize the
defense was Michigan, in Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878), which held that a
burglary conviction should be reversed because evidence of entrapment had been
excluded).
30. See id. at 248-49.
31. See infra notes 38-69 and accompanying text.
32. 223 F. 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1915). The court relied on six state court decisions
as support for the entrapment defense: Love v. People, 43 N.E. 710 (I11. 1896); People v.
McCord, 42 N.W. 1106 (Mich. 1889); Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878); Com-
monwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38 (1910); Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Pa. D.
206 (1903); O'Brian v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665 (1879). Id. at 416.
33. 38 Mich. 218 (1878).
34. See DeFeo, supra note 8, at 248.
35. 223 F. at 414-15. The court objected to the lack of evidence that Woo Wai had
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court recognized that earlier cases had upheld criminal convictions
despite obvious government inducement, but it nevertheless re-
versed the defendant's conviction. The court concluded there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant would have com-
mitted the crime absent the persistent prompting of a government
agent.36
Thirteen years after the groundbreaking Woo Wai decision, the
entrapment defense was endorsed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent
in Casey v. United States.37 In Casey, Brandeis accused the govern-
ment of trying to create a crime, so that it could then punish the
criminal that it had created. 3s His stern dissent stressed the outra-
geousness of the government's conduct, not the wrongfulness of
the defendant's behavior.3 9
Two months after Casey was decided, the Court handed down
its decision in Olmstead v. United States.4 In Olmstead, Justice
Brandeis, again in dissent, contended that the government had
gone to impermissible lengths to obtain evidence against certain
criminal defendants." Brandeis chided the government for ille-
gally tapping the defendants' phone lines in order to build a case
against them.42 As he did in Casey, Justice Brandeis stressed the
ever engaged in any unlawful activity before being approached by government agents. Id.
at 414.
36. Id.
37. 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Government agents suspected that Casey, an
attorney, was selling drugs to certain inmates that he visited. Id. at 422. The agents
began their investigation after a jailer suggested to them that several inmates appeared to
be under the influence of narcotics shortly after Casey visited them. Id. The agents ar-
ranged for two inmates to give Casey money for narcotics during his next visit. Id.
Commenting on the operation, Justice Brandeis wrote, "[t]he Government may set
decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the
criminal, its creature." Id. at 423.
39. Id. at 423-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
41. Id. at 482-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The defendants had been convicted of con-
spiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 455. Federal agents had tapped
their telephones to collect evidence against them. Id. at 456. Agents then listened to the
defendants' conversations for nearly five months before arresting and indicting them. Id.
at 471.
Concerned that the government was committing crimes to catch criminals, Brandeis
wrote:
The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not redress
a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands....
... To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies
the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
Jacobson v. United States
government's unethical conduct, and not that of the defendants. 43
Four years later, in Sorrells v. United States,44 a majority of the
Supreme Court embraced the entrapment defense for the first time.
Though the Sorrells Court did not decide whether the defendant
had been entrapped, it did conclude that the defendant should have
been allowed to assert the defense at trial.45 The Court distin-
guished a government investigation designed to expose criminal
conduct from one that creates it.46 However, unlike Justice Bran-
deis's dissents in Casey47 and Olmstead,48 the Sorrells Court em-
phasized not only the government's conduct, but also the
defendant's state of mind.49
Twenty-six years later, in Sherman v. United States,50 the
Supreme Court finally concluded that a defendant had been en-
trapped as a matter of law. The Sherman Court, following the lead
of the Sorrells Court, considered the government's conduct, but
based its decision primarily on the defendant's state of mind.51 The
secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 483, 485.
43. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
45. Id. at 452. In Sorrells, the defendant was convicted of violating the National
Prohibition Act. Id. at 438. An agent, who had once been a member of the military
division in which Sorrells had served, repeatedly asked Sorrells to obtain liquor for him.
Sorrells refused each request. Id. at 439. Finally, after a protracted appeal to Sorrells's
sense of military camaraderie, Sorrells agreed to obtain some liquor, ultimately selling it
to the agent. Id.
46. Id. at 442. The Sorrells Court noted that "[a] different question is presented when
the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce
its commission in order that they may prosecute." Id.
47. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. 287 U.S. at 441. The Court stated that absent government coercion, Sorrells may
have lacked a criminal predisposition. Id. According to the Court, this factor, when
coupled with the agent's repeated attempts to coerce him to commit a crime, might have
constituted entrapment. Id. at 452.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts condemned the government's conduct. Id.
at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). Though Justice Roberts agreed with the outcome of the
case, he did not agree with the Court that the defendant's state of mind should be a
factor. Id. at 458-59. In his opinion, as soon as the Court concluded that the government
instigated a crime, its analysis should have been complete. Id. at 459.
50. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
51. Id. at 372. This view of entrapment again prompted sharp disagreement. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter criticized the focus on the defendant's state of
mind. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He characterized the entrapment defense
as an expression of judicial outrage over extreme government behavior and argued that
the Court should focus on the government's conduct, not on the defendant's state of
mind. Id. Frankfurter maintained that the majority approach was difficult to apply and,
1992]
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Sherman Court held. that the defendant, an otherwise innocent
man, had obtained illegal drugs only because a government agent
had used unreasonable pressure to induce his conduct.52  The
Court noted that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the
crime when the agent first approached him.53 Therefore, the Sher-
man Court concluded that the defendant had been entrapped as a
matter of law.54
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court continued to refine
the parameters of the entrapment defense. For example, in United
States v. Russell,55 the Court expressly rejected a defense based on
outrageous government conduct.5 6 The Court held that there was
no entrapment as a matter of law because the defendant admitted
as a result, had been ignored by many lower courts. Id at 378-79. In his opinion, the
focus on the defendant's state of mind made no sense, because if the defendant had com-
mitted the crime, his state of mind was necessarily a guilty one. See id. at 379. More-
over, Frankfurter maintained that a test which focused exclusively on the character and
predisposition of the defendant, rather than on the conduct of the government, conflicted
with the policy considerations behind the entrapment defense. Id. at 382.
52. Id. at 373. In Sherman, the defendant met the government agent while in a nar-
cotics rehabilitation program. Id. at 371. The agent met Sherman several times, by acci-
dent, after they both had left the program. Id. The agent requested several times that
Sherman buy the drugs for him, and each time Sherman refused. Id Finally, after the
agent appealed to Sherman's sympathy by describing his own suffering from his need to
use drugs, Sherman obtained the drugs for him. Id.
The agent's conduct in Sherman provides one example of inducement: "One request
was not enough, for [the government agent] tells us that additional ones were necessary to
overcome, first, petitioner's refusal, then his evasiveness, and then his hesitancy in order
to achieve capitulation." Id. at 373.
53. Id. at 375. Sherman's criminal record included a nine-year-old conviction for
drug sales and a five-year-old conviction for possession. Id. The Court held that the pair
of prior convictions did not establish his predisposition to commit the crime that was
then at issue. Id. In fact, his attorneys offered evidence to show that Sherman was ac-
tively trying to overcome a narcotics addiction when the agent approached him. Id. at
375-76.
54. Id. at 373. According to the Sherman Court, focusing on the defendant's state of
mind is proper because "a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal [when determining whether entrapment has been
established]." Id. at 372.
55. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
56. Id. at 425. The Russell Court reversed the decision of the lower court, which had
concluded that "a defense to a criminal charge may be founded upon an intolerable de-
gree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." Id. at 424 (citing Russell
v. United States, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972)).
In Russell, the government agent went to Russell's home to learn the location of the
makeshift laboratory where Russell was illegally producing methamphetamine. Id. at
425. The agent supplied Russell with a hard-to-find ingredient, which was needed for
production of the drug. Id. at 426. Despite evidence of Russell's predisposition to com-
mit the crime, the lower court reversed the conviction, concluding that the government,
by providing the missing ingredient, had acted outrageously. Id. at 424.
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having a predisposition to commit the crime." The Russell Court
concluded that because the defendant's criminal predisposition
outweighed the government's questionable conduct, the defend-
ant's entrapment argument had failed. 58
In Hampton v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court again rejected
a defense based on outrageous government conduct, and focused
instead on the defendant's predisposition. In Hampton, as in Rus-
sell, there was no apparent dispute regarding the defendant's pre-
disposition to commit the crime.' A plurality of Justices in
Hampton stated that it was beyond the Court's powers to focus on
the appropriateness of government conduct. 6' Although the Court
flatly refused to focus on the government's conduct in its decision,
this view was once again espoused in a concurring opinion.62
Moreover, dissenting, Justice Brennan argued that the conduct of
the government in this case was, indeed, outrageous and that the
conviction should be set aside on that basis.6 a
57. Id. at 433, 436. Although the defendant admitted predisposition to commit the
crime, he argued that the extreme degree of involvement by the government agent sup-
ported his assertion of entrapment. Id. at 427. The Court rejected this argument, noting
that "[w]hile we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction,... the instant case is
distinctly not of that breed." Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 435-36. Because Russell admitted his predisposition to commit the crime,
no one disputed whether the government was justified in initially targeting him. Id. at
429. The main point of contention was whether the government's involvement was so
extreme that it superseded all considerations of Russell's predisposition. Id. The Court,
noting the specific facts of the case, maintained that Russell's predisposition was the pri-
mary issue. Id. at 431-32. Its discussion, however, left the door open for future cases in
which the issue of outrageous government conduct would be critical. Id.
59. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 490.
61. The Hampton Court explained: "If the police engage in illegal activity in concert
with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the
equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions
of state or federal law." Id.
62. Concurring, Justice Powell did not believe that the government's conduct in
Hampton was so outrageous that it precluded a conviction. He did, however, believe that
government tactics could conceivably rise to this level. Id at 492-93 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). He maintained that Russell and the line of cases before it did not limit the scope of
the entrapment defense to an analysis of the defendant's predisposition. Id.
Justice Powell was joined in his concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 491
(Powell, J., concurring). Three Justices-Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall--dis-
sented, unequivocally favoring a reversal based on outrageous government conduct. Id. at
495 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, of the eight Justices voting, five actually favored a
greater analysis of the government's conduct.
63. Id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that, in this case, an
alternative to the traditional entrapment defense was available. He suggested that the
jury should have been asked to consider whether the defendant would have obtained the
Loyola University Law Journal
The Court added a new dimension to the entrapment defense by
approving inconsistent defenses for entrapment cases, in Mathews
v. United States.64 In Mathews, the Court held that a defendant
could plead in the alternative by denying one or more essential ele-
ments of a crime and raising the entrapment defense. 65 The Court
did not discuss its entrapment definition in depth, but it did reiter-
ate its emphasis on the defendant's predisposition."
As these cases illustrate, the key factor in the Supreme Court's
entrapment decisions has been the defendant's state of mind.67
Although many Justices and some state courts have focused on the
government's conduct, the Court has consistently refused to focus
on this aspect of a sting operation. 68 This focus on the defendant,
rather than on the government, has caused considerable
controversy.69
III. DISCUSSION
Jacobson v. United States is the latest Supreme Court decision on
entrapment, and it has rekindled the controversy over the entrap-
ment defense. The elaborate government sting directed against
Keith Jacobson raises new questions about outrageous government
conduct. Government agents went to great lengths to implicate a
single man for illegal receipt of child pornography. The concern
over the propriety of the government's conduct is based, in large
part, on the somewhat unusual facts of the case.
A. Jacobson v. United States: The Facts and the
Lower Courts' Opinions
In February 1984, Keith Jacobson, a Nebraska farmer, ordered
two magazines and a brochure from a California adult bookstore.70
illegal contraband from somewhere else, had it not been supplied by the government. Id.
at 496 n.1.
64. 485 U.S. 58 (1988). The Court defined the elements of a valid entrapment defense
as "government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the
defendant to engage in the criminal conduct." Id. at 63.
65. Id. at 62. The Court did not specifically address the issue of whether the defend-
ant had been entrapped. The issue before the Court was limited to the question of
whether such a defense could be raised when the defendant denies one or more elements
of the crime. Thus, the Court's comments relating to the definition of entrapment were
primarily dicta. Id.
66. Id. at 63.
67. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376-78; Russell, 411 U.S. at 435-36. For a detailed
definition of this approach, see supra note 7.
68. See supra notes 7, 38-66 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
70. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537 (1992).
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The magazines, "Bare Boys I" and "Bare Boys II," contained pho-
tographs of nude preteen and teenage boys.7 ' Jacobson ordered the
magazines while it was still legal to purchase this material under
both federal and Nebraska law.72 Three months later, Congress
passed the Child Protection Act, which made it illegal to know-
ingly receive child pornography through the mail.73
Shortly after the new law was passed, postal inspectors discov-
ered Jacobson's name on the mailing list of the California book-
store that had mailed him the magazines.74 In January of 1985, the
government began investigating Jacobson as part of Operation
Looking Glass.7- A postal inspector sent him a letter from a ficti-
tious organization called the "American Hedonist Society. "76
Jacobson enrolled in the organization and completed a sexual atti-
tude questionnaire in which he indicated that he enjoyed preteen
sex, but that he opposed pedophilia.77
Jacobson was not contacted again until May 1986, when another
postal employee found his name in a file. The Post Office then sent
Jacobson a letter from "Midlands Data Research," another ficti-
tious organization. After receiving this letter, Jacobson requested
additional information.78
Jacobson then heard from a third fictitious organization, the
"Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow" ("HINT"). 79 HINT
billed itself as a lobbying organization.8 0 Jacobson responded once
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1538.
73. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who -
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been
transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mailed or knowingly reproduces any visual de-
piction for distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the
mails, if
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section.
74. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
75. Brief for the United States at *11, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535
(1992) (No. 90-1124), available in LEXIS, GENFED library, Briefs file [hereinafter Brief
for the United States].
76. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
77. Id.
78. Id. In his response, Jacobson wrote: "Please feel free to send me more informa-
tion, I am interested in teenage sexuality. Please keep my name confidential." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The letter said the organization's goals were "to repeal all statutes which
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again, indicating that his interest in preteen homosexual material
was "above average, but not high." 81 Jacobson also indicated in
his response that he believed freedom of the press was under at-
tack.82 The "organization" then sent Jacobson a list of potential
"pen pals," but he never initiated correspondence with them.83
The government sent Jacobson this list as part of a tactic known as
"mirroring," which enabled agents to acquire additional informa-
tion on Jacobson's interests.84
Although Jacobson never contacted any of these pen pals, a gov-
ernment agent, using the pseudonym "Carl Long," began writing
to Jacobson anyway. 85 Jacobson responded to Long's letters on
two separate occasions.8 6
By March 1987, the Customs Service began investigating Jacob-
son as part of its own sting, called Operation Borderline.8 7 Cus-
toms officials received Jacobson's name from the Postal Service. 8
The fictitious organization, "Produit Outaouais," sent Jacobson a
brochure featuring photographs of young boys engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. Jacobson ordered material from that organiza-
tion, but for some unknown reason, the material was never deliv-
ered to him.8 9
A short time later, the Postal Service wrote to Jacobson again.
This time, however, it cloaked its correspondence under the cover
of a new fictitious company-"Far Eastern Trading Company,
Ltd." 9 The letter indicated that the organization had found a way
to mail pornography "without [the] prying eyes of U.S. Customs
seizing your mail."91 Jacobson wrote for more information, and
the organization sent him a catalogue. Jacobson then ordered a
magazine called "Boys Who Love Boys" and was arrested after
regulate sexual activities, except those laws which deal with violent behavior, such as
rape" and "to lobby for the elimination of legal definitions of the 'age of consent.'" Id.
81. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
82. Id.
83.. Id. at 1539.
84. Id. The mirroring technique involves a government agent corresponding with the
target of the sting. Id. The agent, who expresses interests similar to those of the target,
hopes that the target will respond with further information about his own interests. Id.
85. Id.
86. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1539. In these letters, Jacobson did not mention child
pornography although he indicated a predilection for homosexual material. Id.
87. Id. For a discussion of this and other child pornography sting operations, see
infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
88. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1539.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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receiving the publication. 92 Jacobson was subsequently indicted
for violating the Child Protection Act of 1984.93
Jacobson pleaded entrapment at his trial, but the jury convicted
him.94 He then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.95 In a panel opinion, the court reversed his
conviction, stating that the government must have a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity before it can target an individual for
an undercover investigation. 96 After granting the government's pe-
tition for a rehearing, an en banc Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reinstated Jacobson's conviction.97 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the question of whether Jacobson had been
entrapped as a matter of law.9s In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court reversed his conviction, concluding that Jacobson
had been entrapped as a matter of law.99
B. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice White began by discussing the
government's case against Jacobson.100 The government, he noted,
had demonstrated Jacobson's inclination to view pornographic ma-
terial, but not his inclination to break the law in order to do so. 10
92. Id. at 1540. The catalogue contained a graphic description of the magazine's
contents, leaving no possible doubt that Jacobson knew he was ordering child pornogra-
phy. Id.
93. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540.
94. Id.
95. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 899 F.2d 1549
(8th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 1001. The panel reversed the conviction because the government had no
"reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts" to justify its decision to target Jacobson.
Id. at 1000.
97. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, Ill
S. Ct. 1618 (1991). Judges Lay and Heaney, who voted to reverse Jacobson's conviction
in the panel decision, strongly dissented. Id. Judge Lay described the government's con-
duct as "reprehensible." Id. at 469. Judge Heaney, describing the net results of a sting
not rooted in reasonable suspicion, offered the following thoughts:
Had the Postal Service left Jacobson alone, he would have, on the basis of his
past life, continued to be a law-abiding man, caring for his parents, farming his
land, and minding his own business. Now he stands disgraced in his home and
his community with no visible gain to the Postal Service in the important fight
against the sexual exploitation of children.
Id. at 471 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
98. Jacobson v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
99. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1537.
100. Id. Justice White was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and
Thomas. Justice O'Connor was joined in her dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy. Justice Scalia joined the dissent, except as to Part II.
101. Id. at 1541-42.
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Justice White criticized the government's role in the sting, stating
that the operation had induced criminal behavior in a party lacking
an independent predisposition to break the law. 0 2
Justice White characterized the Court's decision as a restate-
ment of established law and asserted that it would have no effect on
most undercover operations. 0 3 Because the two elements of the
entrapment defense-government inducement and lack of predis-
position-were present in the case against Jacobson, reversal of his
conviction was proper."° According to Justice White, the govern-
ment had conceded the inducement element of the defense in this
case °10  and had failed to show that Jacobson was predisposed to
commit the crime before government agents approached him."
The government could have established predisposition, had it of-
fered evidence that Jacobson was committing a crime before it be-
gan its investigation. °7 Furthermore, if the government had
offered Jacobson the opportunity to order child pornography when
it first began its investigation, and if Jacobson had readily accepted
102. Id. at 1542. Justice White accused the government of phrasing its correspon-
dence in a way that would make Jacobson not only believe his actions were legal, but even
admirable:
[T]he strong arguable inference is that, by waving the banner of individual
rights and disparaging the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict
the availability of sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited
petitioner's interest in sexually explicit materials banned by law but also exerted
substantial pressure on petitioner to obtain and read such material as part of a
fight against censorship and the infringement of individual rights.
Id.
103. Id. at 1540-41 n.2.
104. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-43.
105. Id. at 1540-41 n.2. However, the brief for the United States indicates that no
such concession was made. Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at *27. The gov-
ernment argued that the nature of its operations--sending correspondence through the
mail--could not be construed as inducement. Id. Jacobson could have, the government
argued, simply thrown the correspondence away. Id.; see also infra note 151 (quoting
government on inducement issue).
Justice O'Connor also argued in her dissent that the government did not induce Jacob-
son to commit the crime. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's argument).
106. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541.
107. Id. at 1543. The only prior evidence that the government had of any criminal
activity on Jacobson's part was a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in
1958. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 999-1000. Before beginning its investigation, the govern-
ment had absolutely no evidence that Jacobson was illegally receiving child pornography
through the mail. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543.
Additionally, no evidence obtained during the investigation established that Jacobson
was predisposed to order child pornography before being approached by government
agents. Id. at 1543. When Jacobson was arrested, the only pornographic materials that
the agents found were two magazines that Jacobson had legally ordered before the inves-
tigation, along with the magazine that the government had sold to Jacobson. Id. at 1540.
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the offer, predisposition would have been established. 0 8 In this
case, however, Justice White concluded that, because the govern-
ment did not prove predisposition, Jacobson had been entrapped as
a matter of law.' °0
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice O'Connor accused the ma-
jority of requiring the government to have a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity before it could begin a criminal investigation."I0
She contended that the Court's decision changed the entrapment
doctrine and would result in unreasonable restrictions on govern-
ment investigations.I' According to Justice O'Connor, predisposi-
tion is typically established when the governments first offers the
defendant a chance to commit a crime, not when the government
first contacts the defendant." 2
She noted that although it had sent Jacobson numerous letters
and surveys, the government had offered him only two actual op-
portunities to order child pornography." 3  On both occasions,
Jacobson readily accepted." 4 His eager acceptances, she argued,
were sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was predis-
posed to commit the crime.'"
108. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541.
109. Id. at 1543.
110. Id. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor illustrated her point by
stressing specific long-term problems that would result from the decision:
[A]fter this case, every defendant will claim that something the Government
agent did before soliciting the crime "created" a predisposition that was not
there before. For example, a bribe taker will claim that the description of the
amount of money available was so enticing that it implanted a disposition to
accept the bribe later offered.... In short, the Court's opinion could be read to
prohibit the Government from advertising the seductions of criminal activity as
part of its sting operation, for fear of creating a predisposition in its suspects.
That limitation would be especially likely to hamper sting operations such as
this one, which mimic the advertising done by genuine purveyors of pornogra-
phy. No doubt the Court would protest that its opinion does not stand for so
broad a proposition, but the apparent lack of a principled basis for distinguish-
ing these scenarios exposes a flaw in the more limited rule the Court today
adopts.
Id.
112. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This distinction is
significant, because the majority conceded that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the
crime when the government offered him the opportunity. Id. at 1542. Thus, under
O'Connor's analysis, the entrapment defense fails.
113. Id. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor also minimized the importance of the prior
correspondence that the government had sent to Jacobson, stating
that Jacobson was free to ignore or discard the letters."16 She ar-
gued that preliminary correspondence is essential in any child por-
nography sting, because a "cold call" offer could scare an offender
away, or inadvertently expose an innocent third party to the illegal
material. " 7
Justice O'Connor also argued that Jacobson was predisposed to
commit the crime when the government offered him the chance.'1 I
She contended that the Court's opinion placed a new burden on the
government in this type of sting case. In order to prevail, the gov-
ernment must now show that a defendant was predisposed to break
the law "knowingly." '"19
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that the applicability of the
entrapment defense in this case was an issue of fact for the jury.1 20
She concluded that a reasonable jury could have found against en-
trapment, and therefore, that Jacobson had not been entrapped as
a matter of law. 12
IV. ANALYSIS
As it worked its way through the court system, the Jacobson
case generated a great deal of publicity-much of which expressed
outrage at the government's conduct. 122 In addition, many schol-
116. Id. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (upholding an individual's right to be free from
offensive material at home); 39 U.S.C. § 3010 (1988) (regulating the mailing of sexually
oriented advertising materials)).
118. Id. at 1543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor objected to the major-
ity's assumption that Jacobson would not break the law. Id. The Court conceded that
Jacobson was inclined to buy the magazines, but it did not agree with the government's
contention that Jacobson would break the law to do so. Id. at 1541. Justice O'Connor
stated that it was irrelevant whether Jacobson would have bought the magazines had he
known it was illegal to do so. Id. at 1546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because he had
purchased similar magazines before (when it was legal to do so), she argued that predis-
position was shown. Id. She contended that "[u]nder the Court's analysis ... the Gov-
ernment must prove more to show predisposition than it need prove in order to convict."
Id.
120. Id. at 1547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, The Court's Open Invitation to Government Snoops,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1992, at C23 ("If the conduct of government agents who lured Keith
Jacobson into breaking the law was bad enough to make the Rehnquist court queasy, you
know it was awful."); Denis Horgan, Court Swats Pesky Government After Painful Sting,
HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 8, 1992, at A2 ("For a moment it seemed like some sort of a
delayed April Fool's Day trick. The Supreme Court denies the government one of its
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arly commentators criticized the government for baiting Keith
Jacobson. 23 Though the Court's decision in Jacobson may limit
the scope of future sting operations, it may not do enough to si-
lence all of these critics. 24
If, as the Court suggests, the government must now be able to
establish at trial that a particular individual was predisposed to
commit a certain crime before being targeted, it will be less likely
to prosecute defendants like Jacobson. Though this new require-
ment may not reduce the number of people that the government
chooses to target in future stings, it will certainly limit the number
of cases that are ultimately prosecuted.'25 The Jacobson decision is
a step in the right direction, but the Court needs to place additional
restrictions on outrageous government conduct. 126
A. Outrageous Government Conduct
Applying the Jacobson Court's reasoning, Keith Jacobson would
not have prevailed with his entrapment argument, had the govern-
ment been able to establish his predisposition to commit the
crime. 127 Unfortunately, this approach leaves little room for evalu-
ating the appropriateness of the government's conduct. The gov-
ernment bombarded Jacobson with correspondence for over two
years, even though it had no prior basis for believing that he was
nasty little opportunities to put people in jail? This Supreme Court? But, lo and behold,
there it is."); Dirk Johnson, Postal Inspector's Porn Entrapment Plunged Farmer Into a
Life of Shame, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 19, 1992, at AI (quoting Jacobson, "Doesn't the
government realize that they can destroy a man's life?"); William Safire, The Stingers
Stung, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at A19 ("You are paying more for stamps these days
to cover the salaries of postal inspectors who spend bureaucrat-years--and hundreds of
thousands of dollars-trying to induce innocent customers into committing a crime by
buying porn.").
123. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Jour-
ney Back, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457, 469 (1990) [hereinafter Marcus, The Due Process
Defense] (advocating a defense based on outrageous government behavior and specifically
referring to Jacobson as an example of unacceptable government conduct); Teri L. Cham-
bers, Note, United States v. Jacobson: A Call for Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activ-
ity as a Threshold Limitation on Governmental Sting Operations, 44 ARK. L. REV. 493,
508-10 (1991) (criticizing the government for targeting Jacobson in its investigation ab-
sent any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); Cynthia Perez, Note, United States v.
Jacobson:L Are Child Pornography Stings Creative Law Enforcement or Entrapment?, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 259 (1991) (discussing the competing interests of law enforce-
ment and private citizens).
124. See Robert G. Morvillo, Outrageous Government Conduct, N.Y. L.J., June 2,
1992, at 3, 8. "Hopefully, the new standards to establish predisposition as laid out by the
Court will limit the government's inclinations to create predispositions." Id.
125. See id.
126. See infra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
127. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-41.
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interested in illegally receiving child pornography through the
mail. 28 Had its luck been different, the government might have
discovered independent evidence to demonstrate Jacobson's predis-
position. According to the Court, this twist of fate would have
rendered the government's conduct acceptable. 29
In these cases, it makes little sense for courts to focus almost
exclusively on the defendant rather than on the government. The
entrapment defense was originally created as a check on uncon-
trolled government investigations. 3 ° Under the current approach,
the government has few apparent limitations on its conduct, as
long as it can show that the defendant had a guilty state of mind.' 3'
Because it held that the government had induced Jacobson to
commit the crime, the Jacobson Court was somewhat critical of the
government's conduct. 32  The government's behavior was cer-
tainly obnoxious. It was unacceptable, however, not because of any
undue pressure exerted on Jacobson,'33 but rather because of the
strong public policy against the government's arbitrary sale of
child pornography to its citizens.
1. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity
Although it argued that it had a reasonable basis for this investi-
gation, the government actually violated its own investigative
128. See supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the elaborate
operation that the government launched against Jacobson).
129. See Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment Revisited, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1992, at 1.
Gershman criticizes the traditional entrapment defense for focusing almost exclusively on
the defendant's state of mind. Id He contends that the defense allows any outrageous
government conduct, as long as the government can prove the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime. Id. He argues that this reasoning produces a pernicious circularity
of argument, which ultimately holds the defendant responsible for conduct caused by the
government's outrageous tactics. Id.
130. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
131. Although the Supreme Court has never recognized a defense for a defendant
shown to be predisposed, some of the circuits have recognized such a defense. After the
Hampton plurality rejected this defense, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ex-
pressly recognized it. United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). The Twigg
court stated that although the Hampton rule will bar application of the entrapment de-
fense whenever it is demonstrated that a defendant had a predisposition to commit the
crime, "fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be convicted of a crime in
which police conduct was 'outrageous.'" Id. at 378-79.
Though the Twigg court concluded that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime, the court nevertheless reversed his conviction. Id. at 382. A similar result was
reached in Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 n.2.
133. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (arguing that the government's
conduct in Jacobson may not have constituted inducement under the entrapment
definition).
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guidelines when it targeted Jacobson.'34 Presumably, the govern-
ment established these guidelines because it recognized that there
must be some limits on government stings. 135
The Jacobson Court did not, as Justice O'Connor claimed, re-
quire that the government have a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity before beginning an investigation.136 A reasonable suspi-
cion requirement would mean that the government could not begin
an investigation until it had reason to suspect that the target was
already involved in a crime. 37 Instead, the Court held that the
government must be able to establish at trial that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime before the government con-
tacted him. 31
Some commentators have called for a reasonable suspicion re-
quirement for all government sting operations.' 39 Even if courts
134. For example, guidelines of the United States Attorney General, the FBI, and the
United States Postal Service require the government to have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before targeting an individual for investigation. See Jacobson, 916 F.2d
at 472 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
16 (Dec. 31, 1980), reprinted in LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES: HEAR-
ING BEFORE THE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDERCOVER AC-
TIVITIES OF COMPONENTS OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 101
(1982) [hereinafter SENATE HEARINGS]); THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Dec. 2, 1980), re-
printed in SENATE HEARINGS, supra, at 121.
135. The Court quoted William H. Webster, former director of the FBI, who ex-
plained the rationale behind undercover operations:
[O]ne of the basic standards for initiating an operation or for making a change
in direction or a change in focus, which is one of the sore points we have ob-
served in these various operations, currently appears in the Attorney General's
Guidelines on Criminal Investigations, and that is that there must be facts or
circumstances that reasonably indicate that a Federal criminal violation of the
type to be investigated has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur. In other
words, a reasonable cause provision.
Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 473 n.1 (citing SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 134, at 1041).
136. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Shrader v. State, 706 P.2d 834, 836 (Nev. 1985) (holding that "when
the police target a specific individual for an undercover operation, they must have a rea-
sonable cause to believe that the individual is predisposed to commit the crime.").
138. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-42. For example, had the government made an
immediate offer to Jacobson, and had he immediately accepted it, his conviction probably
would have been upheld. Id. at 1541. Presumably, the conviction would have been up-
held even if the government had no reason to suspect that Jacobson had an interest in
child pornography, because Jacobson's ready acquiescence during the investigation
would in itself have been sufficient to establish his predisposition. Id.
In addition, the Court implied that if the government, after searching Jacobson's home,
had found child pornography purchased illegally from sources other than the govern-
ment, this too would have been sufficient to establish Jacobson's predisposition. Id. at
1542.
139. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 5, at 1197 (arguing that "police encouragement
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 24
are unwilling to impose this requirement on all stings,'" reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity should at least be required for
child pornography stings, in which the rights of innocent third par-
ties may be at stake. 141
2. Reasonable Suspicion in Child Pornography Stings
Jacobson is distinguishable from other Supreme Court entrap-
ment cases because the Jacobson stings involved child pornogra-
phy. 1 42  This factor made the government's conduct especially
reprehensible, because Jacobson's rights were not the only rights at
stake. Child pornography cannot be produced unless children are
abused, and pornographic material permanently records this abuse.
Though claiming to protect children, the government actually per-
petuates abuse when it sells child pornography.1 43 Stings may be
tactics should be allowed only when law enforcement officials can demonstrate reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is involved in ongoing criminal activity.").
140. The Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to be free from
investigation. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 113 (1990). In an ordinary sting, where only the rights of the target are at
stake, the courts have not recognized a constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion
requirement. Id. In child pornography cases, however, the rights of innocent third parties
are at stake, and a higher degree of care should be required before an investigation is
begun.
It may be difficult to apply different standards to different types of cases, but it is
possible. In his concurring opinion in Hampton, Justice Powell stated that the issue of
outrageous government conduct should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Hampton,
425 U.S. at 494-95 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
141. In its panel decision, later vacated by the full court, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit criticized the government for beginning its investigation without a reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1001. Although the Supreme
Court did not adopt the panel's position, the decision sent a message to law enforcement
agencies to be more careful about whom they target and prosecute. See Jacobson, 112 S.
Ct. at 1541-43. Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, who represented the government in
this case, commented after the decision that "[fthis is a court that says there are limits to
what the government can do .. " Ruth Marcus, High Court Tightens Sting Rules: Child
Pornography Conviction Voided on Entrapment Grounds, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1992, at
Al [hereinafter Ruth Marcus].
142. Most of the Court's previous entrapment cases involved violations relating either
to alcohol or drugs. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490 (narcotics); Russell, 411 U.S. at 424
(narcotics); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371 (narcotics); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 438 (violation of
the National Prohibition Act). The exception is Mathews, which involved a charge of
bribery. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 61. Because of the types of crimes at issue in those cases,
no innocent third parties were injured by the investigations. The sale of child pornogra-
phy, on the other hand, is an act that automatically injures the rights of innocent chil-
dren. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-61 (1982) (explaining that the purchase of
even one item of child pornography harms the children involved).
143. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). In Osborne, the Court upheld a
conviction for possession of child pornography, citing the public policy against the pro-
duction and purchase of child pornography and the state's compelling interest in protect-
ing children. Id. The defendant in Osborne had challenged the constitutionality of an
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essential in the important fight against child pornography, but the
potential harm to innocent third parties warrants a strict standard
to guide the government in its selection of targets.'" At the very
least, child pornography stings should be more limited in their
scope than other types of stings. 145 The government should be pro-
hibited from selling child pornography to its citizens when it has
no basis for believing that its targets would otherwise purchase this
material. 146
Ohio statute, which made it a crime to possess child pornography. Id. at 108. The Court
stated that the possession of this material harmed children because it effectively preserved
a record of abuse long after the initial exploitation occurred. Id. at 11. Because of the
degree of harm involved, the Court expressly approved the portion of the statute encour-
aging those possessing child pornography to destroy it. Id.; see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at
761 (concluding that, because of the harm this material inflicts on children, states have
greater leeway in regulating pornography).
144. Justice Powell noted, in his concurring opinion in Hampton, that crimes involv-
ing innocent third parties are distinguishable from the drug-related crimes the Court has
generally considered in entrapment cases. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). To support his contention, he recalled Judge Friendly's remarks in United States v.
Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973):
[T]here is certainly a [constitutional] limit to allowing governmental involve-
ment in crime. It would be unthinkable, for example, to permit government
agents to instigate robberies and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict
other members of a gang of hoodlums. Governmental "investigation" involving
participation in activities that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a
course that courts should be extremely reluctant to sanction.
Hampton, 425 U.S. at 493 n.4.
145. In United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1991), a defendant was con-
victed of illegally receiving child pornography through the mail, because the court found
overwhelming evidence of his predisposition. The court, however, cautioned that limita-
tions should be placed on these stings. The court distinguished child pornography stings
from other types of sting operations and criticized the government for its role in the
perpetration of the crime involved:
One factor distinguishes this case from the usual undercover operation and, in
our opinion, raises very serious concerns with respect to the rights of third par-
ties-namely, the rights of the children Congress sought to protect in enacting
the prohibitions on child pornography. Our concern is that, in contrast to the
usual sting operation, in which the Government sets up a phony drug transac-
tion or another sort of dummy crime, the government agent in this case en-
couraged Chin to go out and commit a real crime, with real victims, just so
Chin could later be arrested and prosecuted. In particular, [the agent] explicitly
and repeatedly encouraged Chin to proceed with his trip to Amsterdam to ob-
tain "Lolita materials," despite the fact that purchasing child pornography, by
increasing the demand for such materials, serves to further the sexual exploita-
tion of minors.
Id. at 399.
146. See generally Marcus, The Due Process Defense, supra note 123, at 460 (discuss-
ing criticisms of the due process defense and pointing out that even critics of the defense
recognize that it may be valid under certain narrow circumstances).
Professor Marcus contends that some government behavior is so outrageous that the
government should be absolutely barred from obtaining a conviction. Id. at 461. The key
is whether the government's behavior is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience." Id.
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B. The Traditional Entrapment Defense
The Jacobson Court decided this case by applying the traditional
entrapment defense, rather than by evaluating the propriety of the
government's conduct.' 47  The traditional defense focuses on
whether the government induced commission of the crime, and, if
so, whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. 48
The Jacobson Court minimized this first requirement, focusing its
inquiry, instead, on the element of predisposition.149 The induce-
ment issue is important, and the Court should have given it more
attention. Although the Court correctly concluded that Jacobson
was not independently predisposed to commit the crime, the lim-
ited analysis employed in the case does little to restrict future gov-
ernment conduct.
1. The Court Did Not Properly Address the Inducement Issue.
The Jacobson Court largely ignored the inducement require-
ment, because, according to Justice White, the government had
conceded this point in favor of Jacobson.150 The government, how-
ever, briefed this issue for argument.1 5' Additionally, in her dis-
senting opinion, Justice O'Connor vigorously argued that the
government had not induced Jacobson to commit the crime. 52 Be-
cause the Court did not address this issue, there is no definitive
at 462 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). He argues that the stan-
dard should apply regardless of the defendant's role in any given enterprise. Id.
147. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-43.
148. See LAFAVE, supra, note 7, § 5.2(a), at 415-16.
149. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-43. The Court properly concluded that Jacobson
was not predisposed to commit the crime before being approached by government agents.
Id.; see also supra notes 127-38 and accompanying text. The Court went a step further,
however, and painted Jacobson in a light that may have been unwarranted. Justice White
described him as "a 56-year-old veteran-turned-farmer who supported his elderly father
in Nebraska ...... Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1537. This description was unnecessarily
flattering: Jacobson did order a magazine that he knew contained child pornography. Id.
at 1540. The Court may have flattered Jacobson to help validate its focus on his charac-
ter and lack of predisposition.
150. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-41 n.2.
151. Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at *40-41. "The evidence in this case
does not show that overbearing government inducement caused an innocent person to
break the law .... Petitioner concedes that he was neither 'coerced' nor 'force[d]' into
committing the crime." Id.
152. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
main contention was that no government agents had ever contacted Jacobson in person.
Id. She agreed with the government's position that the agents simply sent him informa-
tion through the mail, which he could have easily thrown away. Id. She argued that the
government's behavior did not constitute inducement. Id.; see also supra note 105 and
accompanying text (discussing argument presented by the government in its brief). On
the other hand, Judge Heaney, in his dissent to the Eighth Circuit's en banc opinion,
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benchmark for determining the point at which government con-
duct becomes inducement.
Some circuit courts have held that this type of sting operation
does not constitute inducement. 153 These circuits have generally
held that government conduct, similar to that in Jacobson, is not
coercive enough to be considered inducement. 154 These courts tra-
ditionally have distinguished between conduct that merely offers
the opportunity to commit the crime and that which actually cre-
ates the crime. 155
This distinction is important because a defendant raising the en-
trapment defense has the burden of proof on inducement. 156 It is
only after the defendant comes forward on this point that the bur-
den shifts to the government on the issue of predisposition. 157  If
the defendant does not produce evidence of inducement, the bur-
den never shifts, and predisposition becomes irrelevant. 5 There-
argued that the government's conduct was inducement. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 476 (He-
aney, J., dissenting).
153. See United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1194-95, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1984)
(discussing child pornography sting similar to Jacobson and concluding that the govern-
ment's conduct did not constitute inducement); United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 698
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing inducement in relation to Operation Abscam).
154. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1990) (arising
from a government sting called Project Looking Glass, the defendant's conviction was
affirmed); United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989) (arising from a govern-
ment sting called Operation Borderline, the defendant's conviction was affirmed); United
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988) (arising from a government sting called
Project Looking Glass, the defendant's conviction was affirmed).
155. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369. In Sherman, inducement was obvious, be-
cause the agent had repeatedly tried to persuade Sherman to purchase narcotics, in spite
of his obvious reluctance to do so. In Jacobson, however, inducement was not so clear,
because government agents gave Jacobson only two opportunities to order the materials;
each time he took the opportunity. To say that the mere length of an operation deter-
mines inducement would mean that inducement must be presumed in any long-term sting
operation.
156. See MARCUS, supra note 7, § 6.02, at 212 (citing United States v. Sherman, 200
F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)).
157. Id.
158. Id. There is some dispute among the circuits as to who has the burden of proof
on inducement. Some courts assign the burden of proof for both issues-lack of induce-
ment and predisposition-to the government. See, e.g., United States v. Fusko, 869 F.2d
1048 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. EI-Gawli, 837 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1988). Under this
approach, if the government fails to prove either of these points, the entrapment defense
must succeed. See MARCUS, supra note 7, at § 6.02, at 212. Under this approach, the
government's failure to prove Jacobson's predisposition would have sufficed to prove en-
trapment.
Most circuits, however, follow the traditional approach and split the burden of proof.
Id. The Supreme Court has never expressly stated its approach, but it appears to have
accepted the split burden. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-77 (stating that Sherman
had been entrapped because the agent had induced his conduct and Sherman was not
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fore, if Jacobson had not been induced to commit the crime, he
could not have been entrapped as a matter of law. 59
2. Predisposition Defined: From Sherman to Jacobson
The Jacobson Court may have minimized the inducement issue
because the traditional entrapment defense focuses more on the de-
fendant's predisposition than on the government's conduct.' I The
Jacobson Court devoted most of its opinion to the defendant's state
of mind, and it concluded that the government had to establish
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before
government agents ever contacted him.' 6' In Sherman, the only
other Supreme Court case to hold that a defendant was entrapped
as a matter of law, the Court also defined predisposition by focus-
ing on the defendant's state of mind before contact by government
predisposed to commit the crime). The Court's definition of entrapment has always re-
ferred to a defendant who is induced to commit the crime, and who is not otherwise
predisposed to do so. Id. It does not appear, therefore, that the Court would accept only
proof of inducement or proof of predisposition, on its own, as proof of entrapment. See
supra notes 37-66 and accompanying text (outlining the Supreme Court's definition of
entrapment on a case-by-case basis). The defendant must therefore establish inducement
before predisposition can even become an issue.
159. See United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1064 (1986), where the court gave examples of conduct constituting inducement and
described the defendant's burden of proof as follows:
[E]vidence that the government agent sought out or initiated contact with the
defendant, or was the first to propose the illicit transaction, has been held to be
insufficient to meet the defendant's burden. The defendant must demonstrate
not merely inducement or suggestion on the part of the government but "an
element of persuasion or mild coercion." The defendant may make such a
showing by demonstrating that he had not favorably received the government
plan and the government had had to "push it" on him or that several attempts
at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one occasion he had di-
rectly refused to participate.
Id. at 1499 (citations omitted).
Under the Andrews test, Jacobson may have failed to show inducement. For example,
nothing in Jacobson indicates that he turned down government offers to commit a crime.
At most, he failed to respond to a few of the letters sent to him, but none of those letters
was an offer to commit a crime. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1537. The government only sent
Jacobson two offers to order child pornography. Id. at 1539. He accepted both offers. Id.
160. See Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 53, 68 (1987).
i61. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540. The Court stated:
Where the Government has induced an individual to break the law and the
defense of entrapment is at issue, as it was in this case, the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the
criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents.
Id. (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added)).
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agents.1 62 The Jacobson definition, therefore, is not new; it merely
clarifies existing law.163
One problem with the definition of "predisposition" involves the
Court's interpretation of the word "approached," as it was used in
Sherman. Justice O'Connor interpreted the word to mean the
agent's first offer to commit the crime.'64 In Sherman, the agent
had to make several offers to buy drugs before Sherman agreed. 165
According to Justice O'Connor's approach, Sherman was not
predisposed, because he refused the first offer. Jacobson, on the
other hand, accepted the government's first offer and, thus, was
predisposed to commit the crime.
Because the Sherman Court linked predisposition to the time the
agent first "approached" Sherman, however, another interpreta-
tion is plausible.' 66 The Sherman Court, like the Jacobson Court,
162. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375. In Sherman, the government tried to establish pre-
disposition. The Court rejected its argument, finding no evidence of Sherman's involve-
ment in the drug trade because a search of his home after the arrest revealed no narcotics.
Id. His prior criminal convictions were insufficient to show predisposition "at the time
[the agent] approached him." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Jacobson, there was no independent evidence that Jacobson was involved
with child pornography. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543. A search of his home after his
arrest revealed no illegally purchased materials, except those that the government had
sold him. Id. at 1540. His only known criminal conduct had resulted in a drunk-driving
conviction 30 years earlier. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1000. That type of evidence was insuf-
ficient to show predisposition in Sherman, and it was equally insufficient to show predis-
position in Jacobson.
163. In fact, the standard jury instruction for entrapment closely tracks the Jacobson
Court's definition of predisposition:
If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in
the case that, before anything at all occurred respecting the alleged offense in-
volved in this case, the defendant was ready and willing to commit crimes such
as are charged in the indictment, whenever opportunity was afforded, and that
government officers or their agents did no more than offer the opportunity, then
the jury should find that the defendant is not a victim of entrapment.
1 EDWARD J. DEvrrr, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09 (3d ed.
1977) (emphasis added).
164. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "This Court has held
previously that a defendant's predisposition is to be assessed as of the time the Govern-
ment agent first suggested the crime, not when the Government agent first became in-
volved." Id. (citing Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-76).
165. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373.
166. The Jacobson Court did not rely on Sherman for its definition of "approached."
Instead, it cited Whoie for this proposition. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing Whoie,
925 F.2d at 1483-84). Interestingly, Justice Thomas, who voted with the majority, wrote
the Whoie opinion as an appellate judge.
It is not clear why the Jacobson Court did not cite Sherman for the proposition that a
defendant must be predisposed before first being approached by a government agent. The
word "approached" was used in both decisions. Possibly, the Court did not rely on the
Sherman definition because several offers had been made and rejected in that case before
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focused on the inadequate basis for suspicion, and on the lack of
independent evidence that the defendant was engaged in criminal
conduct, other than that induced by the government. 67 Thus, the
Sherman Court may have intended the government to show predis-
position prior to any contact with government agents.
168
The word "approached" can be defined to accommodate either
interpretation. 169 Certainly, the latter approach is more sound.
The policy behind the entrapment defense is to prevent convictions
for crimes instigated by the government, when the defendant, act-
ing on his own, would not have committed the crime. 70 If the
government cannot establish that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime before it initiated contact, there is an increased
risk that the government will "create" the predisposition. 17 1 The
only way to be certain that the government did not create the
predisposition is to require it to demonstrate that the defendant
was predisposed before any contact with government agents
occurred. 172
C. The Jacobson Decision and Government Stings
Jacobson was a government target in both Operation Looking
Glass and Operation Borderline, two "reverse sting"'' 71 opera-
Sherman acquiesced. In contrast, Jacobson accepted both of the actual "offers"
presented in this case.
167. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375.
168. In fact, after Sherman, some lower courts concluded that predisposition must
exist before any contact with government agents occurs. See, e.g., United States v. Ka-
minski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.
Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that predisposition must be shown "before
initial exposure to government agents") rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3rd Cir.
1982), and cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106).
169. For example, Webster's Dictionary provides definitions that would support either
interpretation. "Approach" is defined as "to draw closer to: near." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 98 (1988). An alternative definition is "to make ad-
vances to esp. in order to create a desired result." Id. The first definition supports the
proposition that any contact would qualify as "approaching." The second definition, on
the other hand, supports the proposition that "approaching" involves taking some asser-
tive action to achieve a desired end.
170. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442; see also supra notes 27-69 and accompanying text
(detailing the development of the entrapment defense and the policies underlying it).
171. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
172. In fact, during oral argument in Jacobson, the government conceded that the
defendant had to be predisposed to commit the crime before the investigation got under-
way. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540-41 n.2.
173. A "reverse sting" is defined as the government's sale of contraband to a buyer,
whom it later prosecutes for the purchase. MICHAEL CALLAHAN, U. S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, ENTRAPMENT AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 56 (1984).
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tions.174 Overall, these stings resulted in a large number of arrests
and convictions for knowing receipt of child pornography through
the mail. 75 Additionally, several child molesters were also ar-
rested and convicted.1 76 The stings have also resulted in three
suicides. 177
The Jacobson stings differed from other child pornography in-
vestigations because the government, in targeting Keith Jacobson,
did not adhere to its own standards.178  When properly designed,
stings provide an effective mechanism for detecting and punishing
crimes that might otherwise remain undiscovered.' 79 Few would
dispute that the battle against child pornography is worth fighting,
but the government must strike a careful balance between law en-
forcement interests and individual rights.
These child pornography stings were designed to identify and
prosecute individuals who received this material through the
mail.18 0 Because a large amount of child pornography is produced
overseas and imported into the United States, the stings targeted
174. Brief for the United States, supra note 75, at * 11. The government stated that
the purpose of these operations was "to reduce the traffic in child pornography by identi-
fying and prosecuting individuals on the demand side of the market-i.e., the mail-order
consumers of such material." Id.
175. The United States government prosecuted 161 people as a result of its child
pornography sting operations. See Daniel L. Mihalko, Far from a Clear-Cut Decision,
WASH. PosT, May 4, 1992, at A22; see also Glenn Kessler, Child-Porn Case Thrown Out,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 1992, at 6 (discussing general effects of these stings); Bob Cohn, A
Fresh Assault on an Ugly Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 1988, at 64 (detailing Operation
Borderline, one of the stings in which Jacobson was a target).
176. Investigators found 35 cases in which children were being sexually exploited. See
Mihalko, supra note 175, at A22; see also Cohn, supra note 175, at 64. For example, in
Ohio, agents arrested a man after he ordered a photo set from Operation Borderline's
Produit Outaouais. Cohn, supra note 175, at 64. Agents discovered the man's two young
children locked in a filthy room. Id. They also discovered an obscene photograph of the
man's daughter, which, he told inspectors, he thought would be "fun to take." Id. One
search in Illinois uncovered over 1,000 child-porn magazines. Id. The agents needed a
truck to remove them all. Id.
177. See Spencer, supra note 12, at Cl (quoting Jack O'Malley, Operation Border-
line's director, "[child pornography] is the scarlet letter of the 1980's [sic].").
178. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
179. A recent article emphasized the value of sting operations in detecting and deter-
ring crime:
If they play their roles well, undercover agents can achieve results in a sting
not possible in cases where the primary government witness is a criminal who
wishes to save his skin. A sting avoids the prosecution's problem of explaining
the sordid past of a main government witness. Instead, a government agent is
unmasked and takes the stand to accuse the sting's target of complicity in a
crime.
Sarah N. Welling, Supreme Court Raises Government Burden in Stings, 3 MONEY LAUN-
DERING ALERT, May, 1992, at 2.
180. See generally United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 34 (4th Cir. 1988) (hold-
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purchasers, rather than producers.'I s  One of the government's
goals was to close the foreign distribution lines.Is8 The government
intended to target only individuals who it believed were already
committing crimes. 83  In many cases, that is exactly what
happened.
For example, in United States v. Thoma, 84 a similar sting opera-
tion resulted in a conviction that is still valid under Jacobson. The
court found that Thoma was predisposed to commit the crime
before being approached by government agents, and that therefore
he had not been entrapped.'8 " The same can be said for a large
number of the cases resulting from these stings. In many of these
cases, the government had information linking the defendant to
child pornography; in others, the subsequent investigation uncov-
ered evidence of related wrongdoing.1 8 6  Either set of circum-
ing that sting operations used to catch and prosecute those who receive child pornogra-
phy through the mail are not contrary to fundamental fairness).
181. Id.
182. See Cohn, supra note 175, at 64. Approximately 95 percent of the child pornog-
raphy in this country is imported from overseas, which is why the government targets
purchasers, rather than producers, in these investigations. Id. Because pornographers
generally operate under a veil of secrecy, government agents find it difficult to identify
individual targets. Id
Operation Borderline was one of the stings directed at Jacobson and was run by the
United States Customs Service. Id. Though agents continually seized materials at inter-
national airports, there had been a drastic decline in the amount of this material inter-
cepted. Id. This led law enforcement officials to conclude that the material was being
imported through other channels. Id. Infiltration of this import network provided the
justification for this sting. Id.
183. See Spencer, supra note 12, at Cl. Director of Illinois State Police, Jeremy Mar-
golis, stated that "(t]he projects may be tricky, but they're never designed to trap people
who would have otherwise not been involved in these things. They're always designed to
lure serious criminals." Id.
184. 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984).
185. In Thoma, the defendant was targeted for the sting after agents received infor-
mation that he was purchasing and selling child pornography through the mail. Id. at
1196. After his arrest, a search of his home revealed a large stash of pornographic mater-
ials exceeding that which the government had sent him. Id. at 1196-97. Thus, the prior
information and the evidence found afterwards indicated that the defendant had a predis-
position to commit the crime before being approached by government agents. Therefore,
under the Jacobson definition of entrapment, Thoma's conviction would stand.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531,
534 (10th Cir. 1987).
In Rubio, 834 F.2d at 451, the defendant was targeted after Customs Agents seized
child pornography being delivered to a post office box that he rented. The sting lasted
approximately one and one-half years. Id. Though the court described the government's
conduct as "offensive," it nevertheless concluded that the seized magazines were sufficient
evidence of Rubio's predisposition. Id.
In Esch, 832 F.2d at 533-34, the government did not originally target two of the three
defendants, the Esches, in the sting. The original target, however, told government
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stances would fulfill Jacobson's predisposition requirement.
Thus, before it launched its long-term stings, the government
should have determined whether Jacobson was involved in any ille-
gal activity. 87 A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is fre-
quently established before an investigation is commenced."'8
When there is no reasonable suspicion, a long-term sting will inva-
riably waste time and money while infringing on the rights of pre-
sumably innocent citizens.1 8 9 Because most sting operations are
less involved than the Jacobson sting, predisposition is often easy to
establish. 9° If the government offers its target a chance to commit
the crime early in the investigation, an eager response will establish
predisposition.1 9' The problem arises when, as in Jacobson, the of-
agents that the Esches were involved in child pornography. Id. at 534. After arresting
them, agents discovered several pornographic photographs of the Esch's children. Id.
In Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 945, the Postal Service began corresponding with defendant in
1982. As in Jacobson, the Customs Service, as part of Operation Borderline, also con-
tacted him. Correspondence continued until 1987, at which time Musslyn was arrested.
Id. at 946. After his arrest, a search of his residence turned up a supply of pornographic
material that had not been sent to him by the government. Id.
187. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1001. Judge Heaney, in the Eighth Circuit's panel deci-
sion, offered several reasons why Jacobson should not have been investigated in this case:
First, the government had received no information that Jacobson was purchas-
ing illegal child pornography through the mails or that he was producing illegal
child pornography. Second, Jacobson had never ordered or advertised for any
illegal material. Third, the government did not inadvertently target Jacobson as
a result of pre-existing investigations. Fourth, there were no independent ar-
ticulable facts that gave rise to the suspicion that Jacobson had committed a
crime or was likely to commit a crime.
Id. (citations omitted).
188. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461-68 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Abscam),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1988); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.
1982) (Abscam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d
578, 609 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (Abscam), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1981).
Reasonable suspicion was not discussed as a requirement in any of these cases, but the
respective records provide evidence that agents had a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity in each case before they began their investigations. Therefore, reasonable suspi-
cion, when coupled with proof of commission of a crime, would probably pass muster
under the Jacobson Court's definition of predisposition. See supra note 161.
189. If the government does not establish reasonable suspicion before conducting a
long-term sting, it must rely on information it gathers during the sting. See supra note
162. As a result, when the government begins a sting without reasonable suspicion, it has
no way of knowing whether it will obtain the needed evidence. If the government does
not obtain this evidence, it wastes time and money because its chance of winning a con-
viction is drastically reduced.
190. Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr stated that the decision would not adversely
affect most stings, because the Jacobson operation was "unusual in its length and inten-
sity." Ruth Marcus, supra note 141, at Al.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 613 (2d Cir. 1983) (Abscam)
(holding that Williams's ready acceptance of an offer to commit a crime was sufficient
evidence of his predisposition); see also United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 822 (D.C.
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fer to commit the crime is not made until the investigation is well
under way.
V. IMPACT
The Jacobson decision is not likely to have a great impact on
future stings. 192 Nevertheless, the Court still needs to set a reason-
able limit on government conduct in stings. One alternative is to
bar prosecution of any defendant netted in a child pornography
sting unless that sting grew out of a reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity. The Court's modified definition of "predisposition"
may mean, however, that the government will be more careful
about whom it targets and prosecutes. 93 If the government now
has to prove that a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime
before having had any contact with its agents, the government may
target fewer people for long-term sting operations. Even if the
number of targets remains the same, the government will be less
likely to prosecute as many people.
Because the Jacobson decision is fairly fact-specific, it is likely to
have a limited impact on future entrapment decisions. In short-
term sting operations, defendants will generally accept or reject the
bait immediately, thereby establishing the element of predisposi-
tion at the outset. 194 The government will still be able to establish
predisposition in long-term sting operations if the target provides
some basis for reasonable suspicion. Similarly, if it finds independ-
ent evidence of predisposition during its investigation, the govern-
ment will have met its burden. It is only in a Jacobson-type sting,
which drags on over a long period of time and produces no in-
dependent evidence of criminal activity, that the government will
have problems establishing criminal predisposition.' 95
Cir. 1984) (Abscam) (finding that the defendant's hesitancy to accept the offer was attrib-
uted to his desire to work out details, not to any reluctance to commit the crime and such
conduct was equivalent to ready acceptance, demonstrating his predisposition to commit
the crime).
192. See Marcus, The Due Process Defense, supra note 123, at 458. An attorney for
the government stated that the Court "has not embarked on a new approach to a case
that should in any way jeopardize law enforcement efforts including sting operations...
[the Court agreed] that sting operations are an important and legitimate law enforcement
technique." Id.
193. See Welling, supra note 179, at 2. Welling warns that the Jacobson decision will
affect sting operations relating to money laundering: "There is little doubt the Jacobson
case will receive wide circulation in the growing number of money laundering cases
which arise from stings of bankers, merchants, politicians and others." Id.
194. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
195. U.S. Solicitor General Kenneth Starr said the ruling served primarily as a re-
minder to prosecutors that their job is to prosecute, not to create crime. Nancy E. Ro-
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court reached a just decision when it reversed Jacobson's
conviction. Unfortunately, its silence on the issue of appropriate
government conduct may suggest to investigators that the ends will
continue to justify the means in sting operations. As long as the
government can demonstrate later that the defendant had a guilty
state of mind, there is no apparent check on its activities. Until the
Court establishes some reasonable limits, Big Brother will remain
alive and well.
MAUREEN DUFFY
man, High Court Rejects US. Child-porn Sting, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at Al. He
said the decision reaffirmed the idea that there are limits on what the government can do.
Id.
Although most Court watchers have predicted that Jacobson's impact will be minimal,
others have expressed conflicting opinions. Id. One commentator predicted that the deci-
sion would trigger increased litigation against the government. Id. He also predicted that
the decision would make it more difficult for the government to combat organized crime.
Id.
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